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Abstract—Bitcoin, the first peer-to-peer electronic cash sys-
tem, opened the door to permissionless, private, and trust-
less transactions. Attempts to repurpose Bitcoin’s underlying
blockchain technology have run up against fundamental limi-
tations to privacy, faithful execution, and transaction finality.
We introduce Strong Federations: publicly verifiable, Byzantine-
robust transaction networks that facilitate movement of any
asset between disparate markets, without requiring third-party
trust. Strong Federations enable commercial privacy, with support
for transactions where asset types and amounts are opaque,
while remaining publicly verifiable. As in Bitcoin, execution
fidelity is cryptographically enforced; however, Strong Federations
significantly lower capital requirements for market participants
by reducing transaction latency and improving interoperability.
To show how this innovative solution can be applied today, we
describe Liquid: the first implementation of Strong Federations
deployed in a Financial Market.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin, proposed by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008, is based
on the idea of a blockchain [1]. A blockchain consists of a
series of blocks, each of which is composed of time-stamped
sets of transactions and a hash of the previous block, which
connects the two together, as presented in Figure 1.
The underlying principle of Bitcoin’s design is that all
participants in its network are on equal footing. They jointly
trust proof-of-work [2] to validate and enforce the network’s
rules, which obviates the need for central authorities such as
clearinghouses. As a result, Bitcoin empowers a wide range of
participants to be their own banks – storing, transacting, and
clearing for themselves without the need for a third-party inter-
mediary. Bitcoin’s network automatically enforces settlements
between participants using publicly verifiable algorithms that
avoid security compromises, expensive (or unavailable) legal
infrastructure, third-party trust requirements, or the physical
transportation of money. For the first time, users of a system
have the ability to cryptographically verify other participants’
behaviors, enforcing rules based on mathematics that anyone
can check and no one can subvert.
Due to its design, Bitcoin has characteristics that make it a
vehicle of value unlike anything that previously existed. First,
it eliminates most counterparty risk from transactions [3].
Second, it offers cryptographic proof of ownership of assets,
as the knowledge of a cryptographic key defines ownership
[4]. Third, it is a programmable asset, offering the ability to
pay to a program, or a “smart contract”, rather than a passive
account or a singular public key [5]. Fourth, and finally, it is
a disruptive market mechanism for use cases such as point-
to-point real-time transfers, accelerated cross-border payment,
B2B remittance, asset transfers, and micropayments [6].
A. Problem Statement
Because it is a global consensus system, Bitcoin’s decentral-
ized network and public verifiability come with costs. Speed
of execution and insufficient guarantees of privacy are two of
Bitcoin’s limitations.
Bitcoin’s proof-of-work methodology was designed to pro-
cess transactions on average only once every ten minutes, with
large variance. As a result, Bitcoin is slow from a real-time
transaction processing perspective. This creates spontaneous
illiquidity for parties using bitcoin1 as an intermediary, volatil-
ity exposure for those holding bitcoin for any length of time,
and obstacles for the use of Bitcoin’s contracting features
for fast settlements. Even after a transaction is processed,
counterparties must generally wait until several additional
blocks have been created before considering their transac-
tion settled. This is because Bitcoin’s global ledger is at
constant risk of reorganization, wherein very recent history
can be modified or rewritten. This latency undermines many
commercial applications, which require real-time, or nearly
instant, execution2. Today, solving this requires a centralized
counterparty, which introduces a third-party risk.
Despite issues of short-term validation, Bitcoin excels on
settlement finality, providing strong assurance against transac-
tion reversals after adequate block confirmations. In contrast,
legacy payment networks leave absolute final settlement in
limbo for up to 120 days typically, though chargebacks have
been allowed up to 8 years late [7], depending on policies
imposed by the centralized network owner [8] [9].
While a popular prevailing belief is that Bitcoin is anony-
mous [10], its privacy properties are insufficient for many
commercial use cases. Every transaction is published in a
global ledger, which allows small amounts of information
about users’ financial activity (e.g., the identities of the
participants in a single transaction [11]) to be amplified by
statistical analysis [12]. This limits the commercial usefulness
of the network and also harms individual privacy [13], as
user behavior frequently reflects the pervasive assumption that
Bitcoin is an anonymous system. Further, it can damage the
1The capitalized “Bitcoin” is used to talk about the technology and the
engine, while the lowercase “bitcoin” is used to refer to the currency.
2In most traditional systems, the speed of transaction is achieved by instant
execution and delayed settlement.
ar
X
iv
:1
61
2.
05
49
1v
3 
 [c
s.C
R]
  3
0 J
an
 20
17
Fig. 1. A merkle tree connecting transactions to a block header merkle root.
fungibility of the system, as coins that have differing histories
can be identified and valued accordingly.
Overcoming these two problems would be of significance
and have positive impact on the Bitcoin industry and the
broader global economy [12]. Unfortunately, previous attempts
to solve similar tasks with electronic money have encountered
a variety of issues: they fail to scale (e.g., BitGold [14]);
they are centralized (e.g., the Liberty Reserve or Wei Dai’s
B-money [15]); or they raise other security concerns [16].
Moreover, higher trust requirements are often imposed through
reliance on a centrally controlled system or on a single organi-
zation. This effectively replicates the problems of pre-Bitcoin
systems by establishing highly permissioned arenas that have
substantial regulatory disadvantages and user costs, that cre-
ate onboarding and offboarding friction, and that introduce
restrictions on both users and operators of the system [17].
Needless to say, if a solution is run by a central party, it is
inevitably subject to systemic exposure, creating a single point
of failure (SPOF) risk [18]. The recent Ripple attack is an
example of such a situation. It has been shown, that although
interesting and successful otherwise, both Ripple and Stellar
face the SPOF risk [19]. Similarly, introduction of stronger
trust requirements can lead to dangerous risks of consensus
failure, as the consensus methods of Tendermint and Ethereum
have proven [4]. Finally, there are exchanges and brokerages
that require explicit trust in a third-party [20]. Such systems
leak their intrinsic insecurity into any solutions built on top
of them, creating a “house of cards” arrangement where any
instability in the underlying system may result in a collapse
of the dependent arrangements.
B. Contributions
This paper describes a new blockchain-based system that
addresses these problems and contributes to the field in the
following ways:
1) Public Verifiability – While not fully decentralized,
the system is distributed and publicly verifiable, leaving
users with the ultimate spending authority over their
assets.
2) Liquidity – Users can move their assets into and out of
the system, giving them access to its unique character-
istics while also allowing them to exit at any time.
3) No Single Point of Failure – The system maintains Bit-
coin’s permissionless innovation and avoids introducing
SPOFs, all while providing novel features.
4) Multiple Asset–Type Transfers – The system supports
multiple asset–type transfer on the same blockchain,
even within the same atomic transaction.
5) Privacy – By extending earlier work on Confidential
Transactions [21] through Confidential Assets, the sys-
tem supports nearly instant, trustless, atomic exchange
of arbitrary goods, in a publicly verifiable but completely
private way.
6) Implementation – Liquid, an implementation of a
Strong Federation, is presented with lessons learned
from the use case of high speed inter-exchange transfers
of bitcoin.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next
section discusses the general design of the solution to the
problems identified above – Strong Federations. Next, in
Section III more in-depth, technical details are provided.
Section IV is devoted to the applications of Strong Federations
in different areas. Here, Liquid is presented, the first market
implementation of the system. Strong Federations are very
novel in many aspects, thus some time is spent discussing
various innovations in Section V, to then move to a thorough
evaluation of the security and comparison of the system in
Section VI. Finally, Section VII discusses methodologies to
further improve them and Section VIII presents conclusions.
II. STRONG FEDERATIONS AS A GENERAL SOLUTION
As mentioned in Section I-A, a consensus mechanism based
on proof-of-work introduces the problem of latency. However,
moving to a centralized system would create significant risks
of its own. To combat these problems, this paper builds on a
design introduced by Back et. al. called “Federated Pegs” [22],
a methodology for two-way movement of assets between
Bitcoin and sidechains. Sidechains are parallel networks that
allow parties to transfer assets between blockchains by provid-
ing explicit proofs of possession within transactions, as shown
in Figure 2.
A. Sidechains
Sidechains are blockchains that allow users to transfer assets
to and from other blockchains. At a high level, these transfers
work by locking the assets in a transaction on one chain,
making them unusable there, and then creating a transaction
on the sidechain that describes the locked asset. Effectively,
this moves assets from a parent chain to a sidechain.
This works as follows:
Fig. 2. Pegged sidechains allow parties to transfer assets by providing explicit proofs of possession in transactions.
1) The user sends their asset to a special address that is
designed to freeze the asset until the sidechain signals
that asset is returned.
2) Using the “in” channel of a federated peg, the user
embeds information on the sidechain stating that the
asset was frozen on the main chain and requests to use
it on the sidechain.
3) Equivalent assets are unlocked or created on the
sidechain, so that the user can participate in an alter-
native exchange under the sidechain rules, which can
differ from the parent chain.
4) When the user wishes to move her asset, or a portion
thereof, back via the “out channel”, she embeds infor-
mation in the sidechain describing an output on the main
blockchain.
5) The Strong Federation reaches consensus that the trans-
action occurred.
6) After consensus is reached, the federated peg creates
such an output, unfreezing the asset on the main
blockchain and assigning it as indicated on the sidechain.
B. Improving Sidechains with Strong Federations
Bitcoin demonstrates one method of signing blocks: the use
of a Dynamic Membership Multiparty Signature (DMMS) [22]
using a dynamic set of signers called miners. A dynamic set
introduces the latency issues inherent to Bitcoin. A federated
model offers another solution, with a fixed signer set, in
which the DMMS is replaced with a traditional multisignature
scheme. Reducing the number of participants needed to extend
the blockchain increases the speed and scalability of the
system, while validation by all parties ensures integrity of the
transactions.
A Strong Federation is a federated sidechain where the
members of the federation serve as a protocol adapter between
the main chain and the sidechain. One could say, essentially,
that together they form a Byzantine-robust smart contract. In
a Strong Federation the knowledge of private keys is sufficient
for the “right to spend” without the permission of any third-
party, and the system has a mechanism that allows settlement
back to a parent chain in the case of a complete failure of the
federation. Not only are the code updates open and auditable
and rejectable in case of coercive behavior, but the state of the
system also provides a consistently reliable log that maintains
immutability of state. Most importantly: the members of the
federation cannot directly control any users’ money inside the
system other than their own.
The network operators of a Strong Federation consist of
two types of functionaries. Functionaries are entities that
mechanically execute defined operations if specific conditions
are met [23]. To enhance security, certain operations are split
between entities to limit the damage an attacker can cause. In
a Strong Federation, functionaries have the power to control
the transfer of assets between blockchains and to enforce the
consensus rules of the sidechain. In the next section further
details will be provided on why dividing those responsibilities
is critical. The two types of functionaries are:
1) Blocksigners, who sign blocks of transactions on the
sidechain, defining its consensus history.
2) Watchmen, who are responsible for moving the assets
out of the sidechain by signing transactions on the main
chain.
The two components can be independent. Blocksigners are re-
quired to produce the blockchain consensus and to advance the
sidechain ledger, which they do by following the protocol de-
scribed in the next section. Watchmen are only required to be
online when assets are to be transferred between blockchains.
As an extreme example, one could imagine a scheme where
watchmen were only brought online once daily to settle a pre-
approved batch of inbound and outbound transactions.
These two functions are performed by separate dedicated
hardened boxes, configured by their owners with the secret key
material required for their operation. The interaction between
the elements of the network is presented in Figure 3. Between
blocksigners and watchmen, only the former are required to
produce consensus, which they do by following the protocol
described in the next section.
III. TECHNICAL DETAILS
Supporting Strong Federations on a technical level requires
the development of two types of federation: the Federated Peg
and Federated Blocksigning.
A. Federated Peg
The authors of “Enabling Blockchain Innovations with
Pegged Sidechains” [22] suggested a way to deploy federated
sidechains without requiring any alterations to the consen-
sus rules of Bitcoin’s blockchain. In their methodology, a
sidechain used a k-of-n federation of mutually distrusting
participants, called the functionaries, who validate and sign the
blocks of the chain (blocksigners) and the pegs (watchmen)
respectively.
A Federated Peg is a mechanism that uses functionaries to
move assets between two chains. The functionaries observe at
least the two chains – the Bitcoin blockchain and the sidechain
– to validate asset transfers between them. To meet the criteria
of a Strong Federation, a set of geographically and jurisdic-
tionally distributed servers is used, creating a compromise-
resistant network of functionaries. This network retains a
number of the beneficial properties of a fully decentralized
security model.
Members of the Federated Peg each operate a secure server
that runs Bitcoin and sidechain nodes along with software
for creating and managing cross-chain transactions. Each
server contains a hardware security module that manages
cryptographic keys and signs with them. The module’s job
is primarily to guard the security of the network, and if a
compromise is detected, to delete all of its keys, causing the
network to freeze by design. If one or a few functionaries are
attacked – even if their tamper-resistant hardware is totally
compromised – the system is unaffected, as long as enough
other functionaries are still intact. Successfully tampering with
the federated peg system requires a compromise of at least
the majority of functionaries, both blocksigners and watch-
men. Even then, tampering is always detectable and usually
immediately observable because the blockchain is replicated
and validated on machines other than the functionaries. A
compromise of a majority of blocksigners would be observable
as soon as a non-conforming block was published. If the
majority of watchmen remain secure, the value held by the
sidechain can be redeemed on the parent blockchain.
B. Byzantine Robustness
One of the most important aspects of Bitcoin’s mining
scheme is that it is Byzantine robust, meaning that anything
short of a majority of bad actors cannot rewrite history or
censor transactions [24]. The design was created to be robust
against even long-term attacks of sub-majority hash rate.
Bitcoin achieves this by allowing all miners to participate
on equal footing and by simply declaring that the valid chain
history with the majority of hashpower3 behind it is the true
one. Would-be attackers who cannot achieve a majority are
unable to rewrite history (except perhaps a few recent blocks
and only with low probability) and will ultimately waste
resources trying to do so. This incentivizes miners to join the
honest majority, which increases the burden on other would-
be attackers. However, as discussed in Section I-A, this setup
leads to latency due to a network heartbeat on the order of
tens of minutes and introduces a risk of reorganization even
when all parties are behaving honestly.
C. Achieving Consensus in Strong Federations
It is critical that functionaries have their economic interests
aligned with the correct functioning of the Federation. It would
obviously be a mistake to rely on a random assortment of
volunteers to support a commercial sidechain holding signif-
icant value. Beyond the incentive to attempt to extract any
value contained on the sidechain, they would also have little
incentive to ensure the reliability of the network. Federations
are most secure when each participant has a similar amount
of value held by the federation. This kind of arrangement is
a common pattern in business [25]. Incentives can be aligned
through the use of escrow, functionary allocation, or external
legal constructs such as insurance policies and surety bonds.
1) Blocksigning in Strong Federations: In order for a
Strong Federation to be low latency and eliminate the risk
of reorganization from a given hostile minority, it replaces
the dynamic miner set with a fixed signer set. As in Private
Chains [26], the validation of a script (which can change
subject to fixed rules or be static) replaces the proof-of-work
consensus rules. In a Strong Federation, the script implements
a k-of-n multisignature scheme. This mechanism requires
blocks be signed by a certain threshold of signers; that is, by k-
of-n signers. As such, it can emulate the Byzantine robustness
of Bitcoin: a minority of compromised signers will be unable
to affect the system.
Figure 4 presents how the consensus is achieved in a Strong
Federation. It is referred to as federated blocksigning and
consists of several phases:
• Step 1: Blocksigners propose candidate blocks in a
round-robin fashion to all other signing participants.
• Step 2: Each blocksigner signals their intent by pre-
committing to sign the given candidate block.
• Step 3: If threshold X is met, each blocksigner signs the
block.
• Step 4: If threshold Y (which may be different from X)
is met, the block is accepted and sent to the network.
• Step 5: The next block is then proposed by the next
blocksigner in the round-robin.
3The hashpower, or hash rate, is the measuring unit of the processing power
used to secure the Bitcoin network
Fig. 3. Schematic overview of how a Strong Federation interoperates with another blockchain.
Due to the probabilistic generation of blocks in Bitcoin,
there is a propensity for chain reorganizations in recent
blocks [27]. Because a Strong Federation’s block generation
is not probabilistic and is based on a fixed set of signers, it
can be made to never reorganize. This allows for a significant
reduction in the wait time associated with confirming transac-
tions.
Of course, as with any blockchain-based protocol, one
could imagine other ways of coordinating functionary signing.
However, the proposed scheme improves the latency and
liquidity of the existing Bitcoin consensus mechanism, while
not introducing SPOF or higher trust requirements as discussed
in Section I-A.
2) Security Improvements: Byzantine robustness provides
protection against two general classes of attack vectors. In
the first case,a majority of nodes could be compromised and
manipulated by the attacker, breaking integrity of the system.
In the second case, a critical portion of nodes could be isolated
from the network, breaking availability.
Blocksigning in a Strong Federation is robust against up
to 2k − n − 1 attackers. That is, only 2k − n Byzantine
attackers will be able to cause conflicting blocks to be signed
at the same height, forking the network. For instance, a 5-of-8
threshold would be 1-Byzantine robust4, while 6-of-8 would
be 3-Byzantine robust.
On the other hand, if at least n− k+1 signers fail to sign,
blocks will not be produced. Thus, increasing the threshold
k provides stronger protection against forks, but reduces the
resilience of the network against signers being unavailable.
Section VII-D explains how the same strategy can be used
for applying functionary updates, which is planned as future
work.
4If “Byzantine failures” in a network are caused by nodes that operate
incorrectly by corrupting, forging, delaying, or sending conflicting messages
to other nodes, then Byzantine robustness is defined as a network exhibiting
correct behavior while a threshold of arbitrarily malfunctioning nodes (nodes
with Byzantine failures) participate in the network. [28]
Fig. 4. Federated Blocksigning in a Strong Federation.
IV. USE CASES
Strong Federations were developed as a technical solution
to problems blockchain users face daily: transaction latency,
commercial privacy, fungibility, and reliability. Many applica-
tions for blockchains require Strong Federations to avoid these
issues, two of which are highlighted here.
A. International Exchange and Liquid
Bitcoin currently facilitates remittance and cross-border
payment, but its performance is hampered by technical and
market dynamics [29]. The high latency of the public Bitcoin
network requires bitcoin to be tied up in multiple exchange and
brokerage environments, while its limited privacy adds to the
costs of operation. Due to market fragmentation, local currency
trade in bitcoin can be subject to illiquidity. As a result,
many commercial entities choose to operate distinct, higher-
frequency methods of exchange [20]. These attempts to work
around Bitcoin’s inherent limitations introduce weaknesses
due to centralization or other failings [29].
We have developed a specific solution called Liquid de-
signed to make international exchanges more efficient by
utilizing bitcoin. The solution is presented in Figure 5, and it
is the first implementation of a Strong Federation. As a Strong
Federation, Liquid has novel security and trust assumptions,
affording it much lower latency than Bitcoin’s blockchain, with
a trust model stronger than that of other, more centralized,
systems (though nonetheless weaker than Bitcoin) [30]. Today,
the implementation allows for one-minute blocks. It will be
possible to reduce the time to the amount required for the pre-
commit and agreement threshold time of the network traversal,
as discussed in Section III-B. This trade-off is worthwhile in
order to enable new behaviors, serving commercial needs that
neither the Bitcoin blockchain nor centralized third parties can
provide.
Liquid is a Strong Federation where functionaries are ex-
changes participating in the network, and an asset is some
currency that is transferred from Alice to Bob. As shown in
Figure 5, when Alice wants to send money to Bob, she contacts
her preferred exchange. The local node of that exchange takes
care of finding an appropriate local node of the exchange
willing to trade within the Liquid Strong Federation to move
assets to Bob. They negotiate the terms, meaning the exchange
rate and execution time, and notify Alice about the result.
If she agrees, the assets are transferred to Bob. Normally, a
very similar scheme would happen on the Blockchain, only the
transaction would have to be approved by the whole network,
thus causing horrible delay in settlement. Because Liquid
operates on a sidechain, we use multisig and if 8 out of 11
participants of the Strong Federation agree on the settlement,
Bob receives his money.
A decrease in latency in Liquid results in an increase in the
speed of transaction finality. This in turn reduces the risk of
bitcoin valuation changes during transaction settlement time
– a key component of successful arbitrage and remittance
operations [31]. The remitter will eventually receive the initial
sender’s bitcoin, but will have mitigated a substantial portion
of the downside volatility risk by executing closer to the time
of sale.
Thanks to the decrease in transfer times reducing the cost
of arbitrage, Liquid participant markets will function as if they
were a unified market. In addition, because Liquid assets are
available at multiple fiat on- and off-ramps with relatively little
delay, a remitter can settle for fiat in two or more locations in
different currencies at price parity. Essentially, Liquid lowers
capital constraints relative to money held at varied end-points
in the exchange cycle as a result of the network structure.
By moving the bitcoin-holding risk, intrinsic to the oper-
ation of exchange and brokerage businesses, from a SPOF
introduced by a single institution to a federation of institu-
tions, Liquid improves the underlying security of the funds
held within the network. By increasing the security of funds
normally subject to explicit counterparty risk, Liquid improves
the underlying reliability of the entire Bitcoin market.
Improvements in privacy come thanks to the adoption of
Confidential Transactions, a specific addition to Strong Feder-
ations that are discussed further in Section V. This provides
users of the system stronger commercial privacy guarantees.
Strong Federations such as Liquid improve privacy, latency,
and reliability without exposing users to the weaknesses intro-
duced by third-party trust. By moving business processes to
Liquid, users may improve their efficiency and capital-reserve
requirements.
B. Other Financial Technology
Significant portions of current financial service offerings are
dependent on trusted intermediaries (and shared legal infras-
tructure when this trust breaks down) or centralized systems
for operation [32]. They have the potential to be supplanted
by new, publicly verifiable consensus systems such as Bitcoin,
which offer improvements to security and reliability [33].
As an example, liquidity provisioning is the primary busi-
ness model of Prime Brokerages and Investment Banks [34].
Fund managers commit their funds to a single location’s
custodianship under the premise of reducing costs associated
with investment management and improving access to both
investment opportunities and liquidity. Third-party broker-
dealers then grant each participant access to the liquidity of
their respective counterparties – a function of aggregation
of capital under a single trusted third-party custodian [35].
This system offers investors a means of preferential access
to liquidity by enabling customers to buy, sell, and hedge
trades with their respective counterparties in a single location.
These centralized systems provide convenience to market
participants, but are not without risks. One realized example
of these risks is that of the Eurosystem following the global
financial crisis, in the wake of the financial default of the
Lehman Brothers. The effort of the Eurosystem to liquidate
assets collateralized by 33 complex securities took more than
four years, and resulted in over EUR 1 billion in losses [34].
The implicit centralization and dependent trust that arise
from systems like these can be resolved via a Strong Fed-
eration. It can remove the element of trust when claiming
ownership and prevent transactions of uncollateralized assets,
while also allowing auditing by existing and new members of
the system. Furthermore, ownership of assets can be proven
and verified publicly.
Fig. 5. International Trade Flow with Liquid.
V. INNOVATIONS
In this section, major highlights of the presented design are
discussed including: improvements to Determinism, Latency,
and Reliability; expansions of Privacy and Confidentiality;
improvements to system integrity with Hardware Security;
modifications to Native Assets; and Bitcoin wallet protections
via Peg-out Authorization.
A. Determinism, Latency, and Reliability
While Bitcoin’s proof-of-work is a stochastic process, the
Strong Federation scheme is deterministic, where each block
is expected to be produced by a single party. Therefore reorga-
nizations cannot happen, unlike in Bitcoin where they are an
ordinary fact of life. In a Strong Federation, blocksigners need
only to obtain consensus amongst themselves before extending
history; since they are a small, well-defined set, the network
heartbeat can be significantly faster than in Bitcoin. This
means that users of Strong Federations can consider a single
confirmation to indicate irreversibility; that confirmation can
occur as quickly as information can be broadcast between the
federation members and processed into a block. It also means
that blocks will be produced reliably and on schedule, rather
than as a stochastic process where the heartbeat is actually a
mean time.
B. Privacy and Confidentiality
Though many users presume that a blockchain inherently
provides strong privacy, this has repeatedly been shown to be
false [36] [37] [38] [39] [40]. The Liquid implementation of
Strong Federations uses Confidential Transactions (CT) [21]
to cryptographically verify users’ behavior without providing
full transparency of transaction details. As a result, the transfer
of assets within a Strong Federation is guaranteed to be
private between counterparties, while verifiably fair to network
participants.
In order to protect confidentiality, CT blinds the amounts
of all outputs to avoid leaks of information about the trans-
action size to third parties. It is also possible to combine
inputs and outputs using traditional Bitcoin privacy techniques,
such as CoinJoin [41]. In typical application, such mecha-
nisms are substantially weakened by the presence of public
amounts [12], which can be used to determine mappings
between owners of inputs and outputs, but in Liquid, the
transaction graph no longer exposes these correlations [42].
The use of CT in Liquid is important for two main reasons:
commercial usability and fungibility. When it comes to the
former, most companies would not be able to operate if their
internal ledgers and financial actions were entirely public,
since private business relationships and trade secrets can be
inferred from transaction records. When CT is introduced this
is no longer a problem as the detailed information about the
trades is hidden. It is also important to improve the fungibility,
because otherwise the history of an asset can be traced through
the public record. This can be problematic in the case of
“tainted money”, which the authorities in a given jurisdiction
define as illegal or suspicious [43]. If an asset’s history can
be backtraced, then users of the network may find themselves
obligated to ensure they are not receiving those assets. Such
forensic work puts a large technical burden on users and
operators of a network and may not even be possible across
multiple jurisdictions whose definitions of taint are conflicting
or ill-defined [43]. This is a potential danger for any type
of system that enables the passing back and forth of value
with a history, but one that can be corrected with improved
fungibility.
Unfortunately, CT comes at a technical cost: transactions
are much larger5 and take correspondingly longer to verify.
All transactions in Liquid use CT by default, making operation
of the network computationally intensive. Mimblewimble [44]
introduces a scheme by which full security may be achieved
without full historical chain data, and by which transactions
within blocks can no longer be distinguished from each other.
This gives stronger privacy than CT alone with better scaling
properties than even Bitcoin without CT. The benefits to
fungibility and privacy of such a system are readily appar-
ent. Further research will be allocated towards investigating
Mimblewimble as a means of confidentially transacting.
C. Hardware Security
In Strong Federations, the k-of-n signing requirement re-
quires full security of the hardware, which will be distributed
across multiple unknown locations and conditions. The signing
keys need to be stored on the devices and not on the server for
a simple reason: otherwise, even if the application code was
flawless and the userspace code was minimized, a networking
stack vulnerability could be exploited in order to gain access
to the host and then any keys. While efforts have been made
over the years to segment memory and create boundaries
through virtualization, memory protection, and other means,
5The range of values CT can support include proofs that are often order-of-
magnitude larger size than ordinary Bitcoin outputs and can be made larger
depending on user requirements.
the industry has not yet been completely successful [45]. The
best solution today is to use simplified interfaces and physi-
cal isolation; Liquid specifically creates a separate hardened
device for key storage and signing in order to significantly
reduce the number of avenues of attack.
While it is true that public review of cryptographic algo-
rithms and protocols improves the security of a system, the
same cannot be said for public review of hardware designs.
Indeed, any measure will eventually be defeated by an attacker
with an infinite supply of sample hardware. However, if a piece
of hardware requires expensive, highly specialized equipment
and skills to examine, it reduces the set of people who might
be interested in (and capable of) attacking it. This is even more
true when a technique used to break a system is destructive,
requiring multiple copies of any given hardware [46].
Unfortunately, the value of hardware obfuscation for secu-
rity purposes holds only until the system is broken. After an
attack is published, the only way to protect the hardware is to
change its design. Thus, Strong Federation hardware includes
a reactive system that, when under attack, either sends an alert
or simply deletes the information that it determines is likely to
be targeted. Traditionally, hardware security modules do this
when they register a significant environmental change such
as sudden heating or cooling, a temperature out of expected
operating ranges, persistent loss of access to the internet, or
other environmental fluctuations [47].
D. Native Assets
Strong Federations support accounting of other digital as-
sets, in addition to bitcoin. These native assets can be issued by
any user and are accounted for separately from the base bitcoin
currency. A participant issues such assets by means of an
asset-generating transaction, optionally setting the conditions
by which additional issuance can take place in the future:
1) The asset issuer decides on policy for the asset it
is generating, including out-of-band conditions for re-
demption.
2) The issuer creates a transaction with one or more special
asset-generating inputs, whose value is the full issuance
of the asset. This transaction, and an asset’s position
in it, uniquely identifies the asset. Note that the initial
funds can be sent to multiple different outputs.
3) The asset-generating transaction is confirmed by a
Strong Federation participant and the asset can now be
transacted. The issuer distributes the asset as necessary
to its customer base, using standard Strong Federation
transactions.
4) Customers wishing to redeem their asset tokens transfer
their asset holdings back to the issuer in return for
the out-of-band good or service represented. The issuer
can then destroy the tokens (i.e. by sending to an
unspendable script like OP RETURN).
Today, users can only trade with one asset type, however
the design allows for multiple assets to be involved in a
single transaction. In such cases, consensus rules ensure that
the accounting equation holds true for each individual asset
grouping. This allows the exchange of assets to be trustless
and conducted in a single transaction without any intermediary.
For that to happen, two participants who wish to trade asset
A and asset B would jointly come to an agreement on an
exchange rate out-of-band and produce a transaction with an
A input owned by the first party and an A output owned by the
second. Then the participants create another transaction with
a B input owned by the second party and a B output owned
by the first. This would result in a transaction that has equal
input and output amounts, and will therefore be valid if and
only if both parties sign it. To finalize it, both parties would
need to sign the transaction, thus executing the trade.
What is amazing is that this innovation allows not only
for exchanging currencies but any other digital assets: data,
goods, information. The protocol could be further improved
with more advanced sighash mechanisms.
E. Peg-out Authorization
When moving assets from any private sidechain with a fixed
membership set but stronger privacy properties than Bitcoin,
it is desirable that the destination Bitcoin addresses be prov-
ably in control of some user of the sidechain. This prevents
malicious or erroneous behavior on the sidechain (which can
likely be resolved by the participants) from translating to theft
on the wider Bitcoin network (which is irreversible).
Since moving assets back to Bitcoin is mediated by a set
of watchmen, who create the transactions on the Bitcoin side,
they need a dynamic private whitelist of authorized keys. That
is, the members of the sidechain, who have fixed signing keys,
need to be able to prove control of some Bitcoin address
without associating their own identity to it, only the fact
that they belong to the group. We call such proofs peg-
out authorization proofs and have accomplished it with the
following design:
1) Setup. Each participant i chooses two public-private
keypairs: (Pi, pi) and (Qi, qi). Here pi is an “online
key” and qi is the “offline key”. The participant gives
Pi and Qi to the watchmen.
2) Authorization. To authorize a key W (which will cor-
respond to a individually controlled Bitcoin address), a
participant acts as follows.
a) She computes
Lj = Pj +H(W +Qj)(W +Qj)
for every participant index j. Here H is a random-
oracle hash that maps group elements to scalars.
b) She knows the discrete logarithm of Li (since she
knows the discrete logarithm of Pi and chooses W
so she knows that of W +Qi), and can therefore
produce a ring signature over every Li. She does
so, signing the full list of online and offline keys
as well as W .
c) She sends the resulting ring signature to the watch-
men, or embeds it in the sidechain.
3) Transfer. When the watchmen produce a transaction to
execute transfers from the sidechain to Bitcoin, they
ensure that every output of the transaction either (a)
is owned by them or (b) has an authorization proof
associated to its address.
The security of this scheme can be demonstrated with an
intuitive argument. First, since the authorization proofs are ring
signatures over a set of keys computed identically for every
participant, they are zero-knowledge for which participant
produced them [48]. Second, the equation of the keys
Lj = Pj +H(W +Qj)(W +Qj)
is structured such that anyone signing with Li knows either:
1) The discrete logarithms of W , along with pi and qi; or
2) pi, but neither qi nor the discrete logarithm of W .
In other words, compromise of the online key pi allows an
attacker to authorize “garbage keys” for which nobody knows
the discrete logarithm. Only compromising both pi and qi (for
the same i) will allow an attacker to authorize an arbitrary
key.
However, compromise of qi is difficult because the scheme
is designed such that qi need not be online to authorize W ,
as only the sum W +Qi is used when signing. Later, when i
wants to actually use W , she uses qi to compute its discrete
logarithm. This can be done offline and with more expensive
security requirements.
VI. EVALUATION
The information moved through Strong Federations will
be very sensitive. As a result, a thorough understanding of
the potential security threats is crucial. This is particularly
important when dealing with Bitcoin, where transactions are
irrevocable. In other words, continued operation of the network
is a secondary priority; few would choose to have their money
move rapidly into the hands of a thief over a delayed return
to their own pockets. As the aggregate value of assets inside a
Strong Federation increases, the incentives for attackers grow,
and it becomes crucial they cannot succeed when targeting any
functionary nor the maintainer of the codebase. Thankfully, as
participants in a Strong Federation scale up the value of assets
flowing through the system, they will be naturally incentivized
to take greater care of access to the federated signers under
their control. Thus, the federated security model neatly aligns
with the interests of its participants.
A. Comparison to Existing Solutions
Existing proposals to form consensus for Bitcoin-like sys-
tems generally fall into two categories: those that attempt
to preserve Bitcoin’s decentralization while improving effi-
ciency or throughput and those that adopt a different trust
model altogether. In the first category are GHOST [49],
block DAGs [50] [51], and Jute [52]. These schemes retain
Bitcoin’s model of blocks produced by a dynamic set of
anonymous miners, and depend on complex and subtle game-
theoretic assumptions to ensure consensus is maintained in a
decentralized way. The second category includes schemes such
as Stellar [53] and Tendermint [54], which require new partic-
ipants to choose existing ones to trust. These examples have
the failure risks associated with trusted parties, which when
spread across complex network topologies lead to serious but
difficult-to-analyze failure modes [55].
Our proposal works in the context of a fixed set of mutually
distrusting but identifiable parties, and therefore supports a
simple trust model: as long as a quorum of participants act
honestly, the system continues to work.
Parallel to consensus systems are systems that seek to lever-
age existing consensus systems to obtain faster and cheaper
transaction execution. The primary example of this is the
Lightning network [56], which allows parties to transact by
interacting solely with each other, only falling back to the
underlying blockchain during a setup phase or when one
party fails to follow the protocol. We observe that since these
systems work on top of existing blockchains, they complement
new consensus systems, including the one described in this
paper.
A novel proposal has been presented recently by Eyal
et al. [57]. Although not yet available on the market, their
Bitcoin-NG scheme is a new blockchain protocol designed
to scale. Based on the experiments they conduct it seems like
their solution scales optimally, with bandwidth limited only by
the capacity of the individual nodes and latency limited only
by the propagation time of the network. However, there may
be game-theoretic failings or denial-of-service vectors inherent
to their design that have yet to be explicated.
B. Protection Mechanisms
An attacker must first communicate with a system to attack
it, so the communication policies for a Strong Federation
have been designed to isolate it from common attack vectors.
Several different measures are taken to prevent untrustworthy
parties from communicating with functionaries:
• Functionary communications are restricted to hard-coded
Tor Hidden Service addresses known to correspond to
known-peer functionaries.
• Inter-functionary traffic is authenticated using hard-coded
public keys and per-functionary signing keys.
• The use of Remote Procedure Calls (RPC) is restricted on
functionary hardware and on Liquid wallet deployments
to callers on the local system only.
Above and beyond, the key policy works to protect the
network. While the blocksigners are designed with secret
keys that are unrecoverable in any situation, the watchmen
keys must be created with key recovery processes in mind.
Loss of the blocksigner key would require a hard-fork of the
Strong Federation’s consensus protocol. This, while difficult,
is possible and does not risk loss of funds. However, loss of
sufficient watchmen keys would result in the loss of bitcoin
and is unacceptable.
Although the Strong Federation design is Byzantine robust,
it is still very important that functionaries avoid compromise.
Given tamper-evident sensors designed to detect attacks on
functionaries, if an attack is determined to be in progress, it
is important to inform other functionaries in the network that
its integrity can no longer be guaranteed. In this case, the
fallback is to shutdown the individual system, and in a worst
case scenario, where the Byzantine robustness of the network
is potentially jeopardized, the network itself should shutdown.
This ensures a large safety margin against system degradation
– assuring both the direct security of users’ funds and the
users’ confidence in the system’s continued correct operation.
C. Backup Withdrawal
The blockchain for the Liquid implementation of Strong
Federations is publicly verifiable, and it should be possible,
in principle, for holders of bitcoin in Liquid to move their
coins back to Bitcoin even under conditions where the Liquid
network has stalled (due to DoS or otherwise).
The most straightforward way of doing this would be
for watchmen to provide time-locked Bitcoin transactions,
returning the coins to their original owners. However, this
updates the recipient-in-case-of-all-stall only at the rate that
time-locked transactions are invalidated, which may be on the
order of hours or days. The actual owners of coins on the
Liquid chain will change many times in this interval, so this
solution does not work. Bitcoin does not provide a way to
prove ownership with higher resolution than this.
However, it is possible to set a “backup withdrawal address”
that is controlled by a majority of network participants,
functionaries, and external auditors. This way, if Liquid stalls,
it is possible for affected parties to collectively decide on
appropriate action.
D. Availability and Denial of Service
There are two independent thresholds involved when signing
blocks in a Strong Federation: the signing and precommit
thresholds. The former is an unchangeable property of the
network and may be set with resilience in mind. It may also
be adjusted to a more advanced policy that supports backup
blocksigners that are not normally online. The precommit
threshold, on the other hand, is determined only by the signers
themselves and may be set to a high level (even requiring
unanimity of signers) and changed as network conditions
require. This means that even if the network block signature
rules in principle allow Byzantine attackers to cause forks,
in practice malicious users are (at worst) limited to causing a
denial of service to the network, provided that the blocksigners
set a high enough precommit threshold.
A software bug or hardware failure could lead to a break-
down in a single functionary such that it temporarily no longer
functions. Such a participant would no longer be able to
take part in the consensus protocol or be able to approve
withdrawals to Bitcoin. Unless enough functionaries fail so
that the signing threshold is not achievable, the network will
be unaffected6. In such a case, funds will be unable to move
(either within the sidechain or back to Bitcoin) for the duration
of the outage. Once the functionaries are restored to full
operation, the network will continue operating, with no risk
to funds.
6Downtime for a functionary does cause degradation in throughput perfor-
mance as that signer’s turn will have to be “missed” each round.
E. Hardware Failure
If a blocksigner suffers hardware failure, and cryptographic
keys are not recoverable, the entire network must agree to
change signing rules to allow for a replacement blocksigner.
A much more serious scenario involves the failure of a
watchman, as its keys are used by the Bitcoin network and
cannot be hard-forked out of the current Bitcoin signature set.
If a single watchman fails, it can be replaced and the other
watchmen will be able to move locked coins to ones protected
by the new watchman’s keys. However, if too many watchmen
fail at once, and their keys are lost, bitcoin could become
irretrievable. As mentioned in Section VI-C, this risk can be
mitigated by means of a backup withdrawal mechanism.
Prevention mechanisms include extraction and backup with-
drawal of watchman key material, so that bitcoin can be
recovered in the event of such a failure. The encryption
of extracted keys ensures that they can only be seen by
the original owner or an independent auditor. This prevents
individual watchmen operators (or anyone with physical access
to the watchmen) from extracting key material that could be
used to operate outside of the sidechain.
F. Rewriting History
It is possible that blocksigners could attempt to rewrite
history by forking a Strong Federation blockchain. Compared
to Bitcoin, it is quite cheap to sign conflicting histories if one
is in possession of a signing key.
However, rewriting the chain would require compromising
the keys held in secure storage on a majority of blocksigners.
Such an attack is an unlikely scenario, as it would require
determining the locations of several signers, which are spread
across multiple countries in multiple continents, and either by-
passing the tamper-resistant devices or else logically accessing
keys through an exploit of the underlying software.
Further, such an attack is detectable, and a proof (consisting
simply of the headers of the conflicting blocks) can be
published by anybody and used to automatically stop network
operation until the problem is fixed and compromised signers
replaced.
If the network was forked in this way, it might be possible
for active attackers to reverse their own spending transactions
by submitting conflicting transactions to both sides of the fork.
Therefore, any valid blocks that are not unique in height should
be considered invalid.
G. Transaction Censorship
By compromising a threshold number of blocksigners, an
attacker can potentially enforce selective transaction signing
by not agreeing to sign any blocks that have offending
transactions and not including them in their own proposed
blocks. Such situations might occur due to a conflict between
legitimate signers or the application of legal or physical force
against them.
This type of censorship is not machine-detectable, although
it may become apparent that specific blocksigners are being
censored if they have many unsuccessful proposal rounds.
It will be obvious to the affected network participants that
something is happening, and in this case the Strong Federation
may use the same mechanism to replace or remove the
attacking signers that is used to resolve other attacks.
H. Confiscation of Locked Bitcoins
If enough watchmen collude, they can overcome the mul-
tisig threshold and confiscate all the bitcoin currently in the
sidechain.
The resilience against such attacks can be improved by set-
ting a high signing threshold on the locked bitcoins. This can
exclude all but the most extreme collusion scenarios. However,
this weakens resilience against failures of the watchmen whose
key material is lost. The cost-benefit analysis will have to be
done as federated signing technology matures.
VII. FUTURE RESEARCH
While Strong Federations introduce new technology to solve
a variety of longstanding problems, these innovations are far
from the end of the road. The ultimate design goal is to
have a widely distributed network in which the operators are
physically unable to interfere or interact with application-layer
processes in any way, except possibly by entirely ceasing
operation, with backup plans to retrieve the funds to the parent
chain.
A. Further Hardening of Functionaries
More research should be done to ensure that functionar-
ies cannot be physically tampered with, and that network
interactions are legitimate and auditable. Methods for future
hardening could include specific design improvements or
further cryptographic arrangements. In a Strong Federation,
compromised functionaries are unable to steal funds, reverse
transactions, or influence other users of the system in any way.
However, enough malicious functionaries can always stall the
network by refusing to cooperate with other functionaries or
by shutting down completely. This could freeze funds until an
automatic withdrawal mechanism starts.
As such, it would be beneficial to research possibilities
for creating incentive structures and methods to encourage
functionary nodes to remain online under attack. This could
be done, for example, by requiring that they periodically
sign time-locked transactions. These incentives could prevent
certain denial-of-service attacks.
B. Enlightening Liquid
The privacy and speed of a Strong Federation could be
further improved by combining it with Lightning [56]. Just as
with Bitcoin’s network, the throughput of initial systems built
with this architecture is limited on purpose, as the transactions
are published in blocks that must be made visible to all
participants in the network. This threshold is set by the need
for everyone to see and validate each operation. Even with
a private network that mandates powerful hardware, this is a
serious drawback.
With Lightning, individual transactions only need to be
validated by the participating parties [56]. This dramatically
reduces the verification load for all participants. Because end-
to-end network speed is the only limiting factor [58], it also
greatly reduces the effects of network latency.
Furthermore, nodes in a Strong Federation could route
payments via Lightning, a network of bidirectional payment
channel smart contracts. This may allow for even more
efficient entry and exit from the Liquid network. Finally,
Lightning can replace inter-chain atomic swap smart contracts
and probably hybrid multi-chain transitive trades [26] without
having the limitation of a single DMMS chain.
C. Confidential Assets
Confidential Transactions (CT) hide the amounts but not
the types of transacted assets, so its privacy is not as strong
as it could be. However, CT could be extended to also hide
the asset type. For any transaction it would be impossible to
determine which assets were transacted or in what amounts,
except by the parties to the transaction. Called Confidential
Assets (CA), this technology improves user privacy and allows
transactions of unrelated asset classes to be privately spent in
a single transaction. However, the privacy given to assets is
qualitatively different than that of CT.
Consider a transaction with inputs of asset types A and
B. All observers know that the outputs have types A and B,
but they are unable to determine which outputs have what
types (or how they are split up or indeed anything about their
amounts). Therefore all outputs of this transaction will have
type “maybe A, maybe B” from the perspective of an observer.
Suppose then that an output of type A, which is a “maybe
A, maybe B” to those not party to the transaction, is later
spent in a transaction with an asset type C. The outputs of
this transaction would then be “maybe A, maybe B, maybe
C” to outside observers, “maybe A, maybe C” to those party
to the first transaction, and known to those party to the second.
As transactions occur, outputs become increasingly ambigu-
ous as to their type, except to individual transactors, who know
the true types of the outputs they own. If issuing transac-
tions always have multiple asset–types, then non-participant
observers never learn the true types of any outputs.
D. Byzantine-Robust Upgrade Paths
Most hardening approaches rely on a central, trusted third-
party who can provide upgrades: operating systems and other
critical software wait for signed software packages, generated
in locked down build labs, then hosts retrieve these packages,
verify signatures, and apply them, often automatically. This
would undermine the threat model of a Strong Federation,
as any SPOF can be compromised or coerced to comply.
All aspects of the change control system must instead be
defensibly Byzantine secure. In any large system, one must
assume some part of it may be in a state of failure or
attack at any point in time. This means that what can be a
simple process for a central authority becomes somewhat more
complex.
Unfortunately, creating an agile network, or a system that
is upgradable, requires a security tradeoff. An ideal balance is
hard to strike: as a network’s independence grows, the cost and
difficulty in upgrading also increases. As such, it is important
that all changes in the code should be opt-in for all parties
and the process should be consensus (k-of-n) driven across the
functionary set. These changes should also be fully auditable
and transparent prior to application.
Ultimately, the processes of maintenance, of new member
additions, or of strict improvements to the network must also
be Byzantine secure for the whole system to be Byzantine
secure. For Bitcoin, this is achieved by a long-tail upstream
path which is an audited and open-source procedure, and
ultimately the consensus rules each user decides to validate
are self-determined (i.e., there may be permanent chain splits
in case of controversial changes).
For Strong Federations, this will be achieved through the
design and implementation of an upgrade procedure that
enables iterative improvement to the system without enabling
attack surfaces by emulating Bitcoin’s soft-fork upgrade path.
This is presented in Figure 6, and follows the steps:
1) An upstream software provider (USP) writes software
updates for the functionary network and provides those
updates to the functionaries for implementation.
2) An external security auditor may be used to review
the software update and documentation for correctness,
verifying the accuracy of the documentation and/or the
codebase itself.
3) Each functionary verifies the signatures from the USP
and possibly the third-party auditor, and may also review
or audit the updates if it wishes.
4) Each functionary signs the update on the server and
returns the resulting signature to the USP.
5) Once a supermajority of functionaries have signed the
update, the USP combines their signatures and the
update image into a single package. This file, consisting
of the update image, documentation, and a supermajority
of functionary signatures, is then distributed to each
functionary.
6) Each functionary receives the USP and supermajority
signatures on their server.
7) Each functionary verifies the package contents and ap-
plies the update.
Note that this situation assumes honest participants. There
are scenarios in which, for instance, a single group of col-
laborating malicious functionaries can collectively reject any
given upgrade path. Methods of combating this scenario will
be further investigated.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The popularity of Bitcoin shows that permissionless proof-
of-work is an effective mechanism for developing an infras-
tructure, with hundreds of millions of dollars [59] across
dozens of companies being invested in new innovations span-
ning chip and network design, datacenter management, and
cooling systems [60]. The value of the security offered by
this conglomerate of resources is immense. There is, however,
a drawback of the proof-of-work underlying Bitcoin [2]:
the addition of latency (the block time) to establish widely
distributed checkpoints for the shared, current state of the
ledger.
This paper introduces the Strong Federation: a federated
consensus mechanism which significantly mitigates a num-
ber of real-world systemic risks when used in conjunction
with proof-of-work. The solution is resilient against broad
categories of attacks via specific implementation decisions
and minimization of attack surfaces. Strong Federations im-
prove blockchain technology by leveraging sidechain technol-
ogy. Furthermore, market enhancements utilizing Confidential
Transactions and Native Assets are proposed.
This paper proposes a methodology that utilizes hardware
security modules (HSMs) for enforcing consensus. Currently
HSMs have limited ability to verify that their block signatures
are only used on valid histories that do not conflict with
past signatures. This arises both because of the performance
limitations in secure hardware and because anything built into
an HSM becomes unchangeable, making complex rule sets
difficult and risky to deploy. Improved verification requires
HSMs to support an upgrade path that is sufficiently capable
while being hardened against non-authorized attempts at up-
grading. Alternatively, every software deployment may imply
a new hardware HSM deployment, but that’s not cost efficient.
The first working implementation of a Strong Federation
is Liquid – a Bitcoin exchange and brokerage multi-signature
sidechain that bypasses Bitcoin’s inherent limitations while
leveraging its security properties. In Liquid, Bitcoin’s proof-of-
work is replaced with a k-of-n multisignature scheme. In this
model, consensus history is a blockchain where every block is
signed by the majority of a deterministic, globally distributed
set of functionaries running on hardened platforms, a method-
ology that directly aligns incentives for the participants.
Strong Federations will be useful in many general-purpose
industries – especially those that seek to represent and ex-
change their assets digitally and must do so securely and
privately without a single party that controls the custodianship,
execution, and settling of transactions.
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